Having previously been an avid Formula 1 watcher,
I find myself compelled to write a piece on one of the factors that contributed
to my stopping watching the sport I love a couple of years ago: namely, the utter
disregard for the political implications of the sport’s refusal to cancel the Grand
Prix in Bahrain. The sport has collectively contributed to legitimising the
regime in Bahrain, despite a vast human rights crisis in the country. The
reasons are not hard to find.
The Bahrain Grand Prix takes place this weekend. Since the
Arab Spring erupted in 2011 Bahrain has been largely off the news agenda and
off the lips of Western officials, but the importance of the small Sheikdom is
not negligible. Located in the most important strategic energy location in the
world, the Gulf Peninsula, it forms a vital part of the system of global energy
supplies. All 6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, are ruled as dictatorships with severe levels
of repression, and if one were to fall to democracy, the others could follow.
Bahrain has seen the most unrest
of the GCC states since 2011, as the Shia majority has attempted to rise up
against the minority Sunni rulers. Around 90 protesters have been shot dead in
the streets. Incarceration without trial and torture is rampant, as confirmed in
an official report set
up by the Bahraini government as part of a ‘reform’ process. The report even
stated that the torture and repression ‘could not have happened without the
knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure’. The Bahraini government
then went on a tour de force to whitewash its record, employing Western
PR firms to use an array of techniques
to make it seem like a progressive, reformist regime. The ostensive
reform-agenda has failed to fool human rights groups, who have continued to
document how doctors have been trialled for helping
wounded protesters, activists have been taken
from their homes in raids, and objectors to brutal police treatment have
been thrown
in prison.

In March 2011 Saudi Arabia ‘intervened’
in Bahrain (at the ‘request’ of the Bahraini government) to help put down
the uprising, with little Western protest. Former British Ambassador to
Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, wrote how a senior
Western diplomat at the UN assured him that Hillary Clinton (then-US Secretary
of State) gave an explicit green light to Saudi Arabia to carry out the
invasion in return for Saudi support at the Arab League for the Western intervention
in Libya. These claims were also reportedly given to the Asia Times Online which claims that
‘two different diplomats, a European and a member of the BRIC group’ stated
that this US-Saudi deal had been struck. It is impossible to confirm these
claims, but they seem plausible given the interests the US has in Bahrain, the
close relationship between the Saudi’s and the US, and similar US actions in
the past (more on that in later weeks).
Bahrain is home to the US
Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and along with the other Gulf states, buys millions of
dollars (and pounds) worth of military equipment off the US and UK every year. The
Saudi National Guard, which was the main force used to crush the protests in Bahrain,
has long been trained
by British forces, including in ‘public order and sniper training’. In
September 2011, the
US moved to
sell ‘armored vehicles and optically-tracked wire-guided missiles to
Bahrain for an estimated cost of $53 million’. In
2012, ‘licenses were granted for £2.2m-worth of UK weapons to be exported’
to Bahrain. Bahrain is designated by the US as a ‘major non-NATO
ally’.
A report by the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations,
headed by the now-US Secretary of State John Kerry, explicitly states why the
US has made no effort to help the democracy protesters in Bahrain. The major
goals for the US in the region, it explains,
are for ‘The United States [to] carefully shape its military presence so as not
to create a popular backlash, while retaining the capability to protect the
free flow of critical natural resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran’
(page 4). A passing mention to democracy is made, with no real recommendations
on how this is to be achieved. The main focus for the US and UK is on
preserving the dictatorial, bloody regime in Bahrain, a compliant, pro-Western
government that does its best to serve Western interests and keep the
population subdued.
Against this backdrop, Formula 1 has done its best to keep in
line with elite opinion in the West. After the race was called off for a while
in 2011, it has gone ahead the following two years despite mass
protests by the Bahraini people calling for it to be cancelled. The wilful
ignorance amongst the F1 elite is astounding- racing legend Jackie Stewart claimed
that the unrest was ‘no different to the Glasgow Rangers and the Glasgow
Celtics’, and that Bahrain has ‘already started a move towards democracy’. The
ever-principled Bernie Ecclestone (head of F1) has compared
the protests to those at Thatcher’s funeral in Britain, and last year
called all controversy ‘a lot of nonsense’. He claimed he wanted
an earthquake to occur so the media would start writing about that instead.
In 2012, three-time World Champion Sebastian Vettel felt that it was ‘all a lot
of hype’, and wished it would blow over so ‘then we can start worrying about
the stuff that really matters like tyre temperatures, cars’. Clearly tear
gas being fired at protesters, ITN film crew being forced
to leave the country for filming protests, and detention
of leading activists is of little concern to teams, drivers, and Formula 1
bosses.
Conservative MP David Davis last year called it an ‘example of where big money
is over-ruling serious ethical concerns’, and his analysis is surely partly
correct. To F1, the money is far more important than the principle. However, the
race acts not only as a large source of revenue for F1 and the Bahraini
government, but it also helps legitimise the ruling class in Bahrain, the
favoured Western allies. That there should be little concern for human rights
and democracy is of little surprise, when the people who run F1 are no doubt
immersed in the norms and values of the elite class to which they belong. Commercial
incentives are important, but not necessarily the entire story. As Robert Fisk pointed
out last year, would Bernie Ecclestone host a race in Iran or Syria,
Western enemies, even if they were prepared to pay $40m to do so? The answer is
likely no- F1 will host races in countries which are ruled by governments the
West likes, no matter how oppressive they are. But when the government is an ‘official
enemy’ of the West, suddenly the human rights issues, and the legitimacy which
the race would lend the ‘enemy’ government, become important (China is a
special case). That is why the Western client-regime of Bahrain will continue
to be allowed to host races as it guns down and tortures its citizens- and why
we won’t be hearing about the Tehran Grand Prix any time soon.
Another post on Bahrain and the Gulf states will follow in the coming weeks.
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